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| 篇名 |
管理學報，
2002
第十九卷第一期：109-145
DOI：
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| 會計師執業資格、法律責任與審計市場之研究 |
| CPAs' Licensing Requirement, Legal Liability, and the Audit Market |
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| 本研究以分析性模式探討會計師執業資格限制與會計師法律責任制度改變時所可能造成的影響。若法律責任制度不變而提高會計師執業資格的最低水準，則模型預測將有下列後果：審計公費增加、客戶之審計利益降低、會計師個人之審計品質增加，但由於進入審計市場執業之會計師的組成份子可能不同，市場中平均的審計品質則未必如一般人預期會增加。倘若不改變對會計師執業資格之要求，而將法律責任由無限責任制改為有限責任制時，模型預測：審計公費下降、客戶之審計利益增加，此時進入市場執業的會計師亦不同，部份較富有的會計師將取代較不富有的會計師，市場上平均審計品質未必如一般人預期會下降。不過若法律責任制度與執業資格同時改變，由於兩者作用的方式不同，故平均審計品質及客戶之審計利益的增加與否將視模型參數的數值而定，必須透過實證資料，再作數值分析才能判定。 |
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This research uses analytical method to study the effects of the change in CPAs’ licensure requirement and legal responsibility on the audit market. Results indicate that, as we elevate the minimum requirement for CPA licensing when holding constant the legal liability system, in equilibrium the audit fee will increase, net benefits to the audit clients will decline, individual CPA’s audit quality will rise, whereas the average audit quality in the market may not increase since the market participants are different under the new system. On the other hand, if we change the legal liability regime from unlimited to limited liability while holding constant the minimum requirement for CPA licensing, the model predicts that the audit fee will decrease, net benefits to the clients will increase, the average audit quality in the market may not necessarily decline as one might expect, since some less wealthy CPAs wil I be replaced by the richer ones who could offer higher audit quality. Finally, if both the legal liability regime and licensing requirement are shifted, then how the average audit quality and net benefit to the clients are going to change in general will depend on the strength of the two forces and will ultimately be determined by the parameters in the model, which is an empirical question.
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| Audit market regulation, Licensing requirement, Auditor liability |
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