Factors Influencing Voluntary Information Disclosure by the Defendant Firms in Patent Infringement Litigation Cases-Perspectives from Game Theory and RBV
Compared with plaintiffs, the impacts of patent infringement litigation on defendants are much greater. Surprisingly, previous studies on patent infringement litigation devote less attention on the defendants’ behavior of voluntary information disclosure. In order to fill the theoretical gap, this study adopts both game theory and resource-based view to explore the defendant’s behavior of voluntary information disclosure during the earlier period of a patent litigation event. This study selected Taiwanese publicly held corporations which were defendants from 2008 to 2010, which consists of 152 litigation cases from 17 industries. Empirical results indicate that two characteristics of patent litigation cases, multiple-site lawsuits and ITC lawsuit, positively influence defendants’ willing to voluntarily disclosure relevant information about patent infringement events, while one-to-multiple lawsuit and lawsuits initiated by patent trolls have a negative impact on the defendants’ willing to disclosure. Regarding firm resources, the present study finds that goodwill and debt ratio are negatively related to the defendant’s intention to voluntarily disclosure information.
英文關鍵字
Voluntary Information Disclosure, Game Theory, Resource-Based View, Patent Litigation, Corporate Governance
