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篇名 管理學報, 2009
第二十六卷第三期:233-253
DOI: 10.6504/JOM.2009.26.03.01
公司治理是否受到機構投資人的青睞
Does Corporate Governance Matter to Institutional Investors?
作者
中文摘要
本文旨在探究對想吸引機構投資人的首度上市公司而言,公司治理是否為一個重要的條件,機構投資人是否在意首度上市公司的公司治理程度。本研究從股權,董事會與公司結構,資訊揭露品質與管理型態等公司治理構面發現公司治理確實會影響機構投資人持股,實證結果顯示大股東持股比例高,控制股東董事席次多,資訊揭露品質佳的公司較受機構投資人的青睞。縱使公司績效不佳,控制股東董事席次高仍可減緩侵佔的現象,使公司獲得機構投資人的青睞。當企業本身公司治理程度佳時,會減緩公司治理對機構投資人的吸引力。法令規範設置獨立董事後影響機構投資人的公司治理變數確實有所改變,獨立董監事對機構投資人的影響,必須考量控制股東董事席次與獨立董監事的交互影響才成立,實證結果證實獨立董監事的正面影響,也支持獨立董監事與控制股東董事二者具替代效果的論點。本研究考慮額外的公司治理變數,控制變數,排除股權較分散的樣本與不同變數衡量方式後,結果仍維持不變。
中文關鍵字
公司治理、機構投資人
英文摘要
The purpose of this paper is to identify whether the corporate governance mechanism is a major determinant for IPO firms which intend to attract the institutional investors. Does IPO’s corporate governance matter to institutional investors? This paper examines the effect of corporate governance mechanism induced by ownership, board and firm structures, and information disclosure on institutional investors’ shareholdings. The result indicates that firms with higher blockholder shareholdings, more control shareholders on the board, better information disclosure, and the controlling shareholder not serving as president or CEO at the same time would attract more institutional investors. Even though the performance is poor, more control shareholders on the board still could loosen expropriation and draw more institutional shareholdings. The influence of corporate governance on institutional investors is weak as the firm performs better corporate governance. After the rule’s requiring setting the independent directors, the influence of corporate governance on institutional investors does change. However, the effect of the independent directors on the institutional investors exists only when the interaction term of control shareholders on the board and independent directors is concerned in the model. The positive impact of independent directors is proved. It shows evidence that the independent directors could substitute for the control shareholders. The results remain the same after controlling for additional corporate governance and control variables, elimination of widely held ownership firms, and adopting different proxies.
英文關鍵字
Corporate Governance, Institutional Investors
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