The present research focuses on the Taiwan black-elephant match-fixing scandal. We apply the fraud triangle theory to explore the key financial and non-financial factors related to the scandal. We apply network analysis to explore the correlations between these key factors and to examine the impact of participants’ attitude (whether players involved in scandal should be given another chance) on these correlations. The analysis also demonstrates that the key factors of a match-fixing scandal include salary structure and guarantee, gangster threats & lures, weak management system, benefits decision, rationalization of wrong behavior, lack of morality player’s loss, and short career. These factors are different from the ones identified in the previous research in the financial discipline. In addition, the diversity of attitudes influences the judgment and correlation of the key factors of a match-fixing scandal. Those who are willing to give the players another chance will focus more on the circumstances of the players involved; however, opponents provide arguments about the moral sense and negative impact on the society that this may cause. Our research extends the application of the fraud triangle theory to non-financial disciplines and provides a new perspective for preventing match-fixing scandals in the baseball industry.
